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CHAPTER ONE: Focus of the Investigation

1.1 Introduction
Natural resources such as copper, oil, gold, diamonds and manage historically play a dynamic
role in many countries’ development and growth, as they provide employment, generate tax
revenues and earn foreign exchange. The impact of mining sectors on economic development in
these countries cannot be overemphasized, as they create employment opportunities for
individuals on the domestic, sub-regional and international levels (i.e. direct or indirect
employment, e.g. mining suppliers, contractors, international consultants, engineers etc.), and
transfers modern technology and skills, thus altering the structure of their economies and
providing the basis and potential for “sustainable growth.”
Copper is one resource which has the potential to build a nation’s economy through the injection
of enormous levels of foreign investment and the transfer of advanced technology and skills. One
of world’s largest sources of copper ore is found Zambia. Following the first commercial mine,
which was opened in 1928 at Roan Antelope (now Luanshya), copper mining has dominated
Zambia’s economy, with Zambia being the second largest producer of copper in Africa following
the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).1
Copper mining in Zambia accounts for about three quarters of the nation’s export earnings,2 16%
of the nation’s gross domestic product (GDP) and roughly 20% of the overall formal

1

Https://www.facebook.com/AfricanBusinessMagazine." DRC Now Africa's Biggest Copper Producer - African Business
Magazine." African Business Magazine. 2015. Accessed December 06, 2016.
http://africanbusinessmagazine.com/sectors/commodities/drc-now-africas-biggest-copper-producer/.
2 Abi, D. (2007), Undermining Development? Copper Mining in Zambia, A joint Report by ACTS, Christian Aid and Scotland
Agency
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employment.3 The mining industry as a whole was reported in the Government’s 2015 Economic
Report to have contributed $5,457.1M US dollars (74.7 percent) of the entire export earnings of
$7,305.71160 million in 2015. Of this amount, $5,304. 3M US dollars originated from the
auctions of copper and cobalt only.
Although the immense contribution of mining toward economic growth and public finance,
copper mining in Zambia has also produced enormous negative social-environmental impacts,
owing to historical legacies from mining. This reinforces the notion that mineral wealth does not
in the long term sustain and increase a nation’s economy in a manner that provides equitable
development; indeed, in many cases, it hinders inclusive development and is responsible for
environmental degradation and persistent poverty, sometimes leading to social unrest and
conflict. For example, Zimbabwe has enjoyed huge diamond and gold revenues from as far back
as the late 1960s; nevertheless, its per capita GDP is currently among the lowest in the world.
Copper mining remains the backbone of Zambia’s economic sector. Yet inadequate resources
and training, and the adoption of cheap but potentially dangerous approaches to extraction and
processing of minerals, has created significant dangers for both local communities and the
environment at large. Such a situation has been and is being experienced in most of Zambia’s
copper mining districts. It is important to measure the scale of these social and environmental
problems and to advance practical methods to deal with them. For example, the Consolidated
Environmental Management Plan (CEMP) assessed the impact of copper mining on the Zambian
Copper Belt Province and determined that most of the mining townships had significant levels of

3

“Analysis on Copper Mining Trends in Zambia-ZCCM Investments Holdings Plc." ZCCM Investments Holdings Plc. 2016.
Accessed December 06, 2016. http://www.zccm-ih.com.zm/analysis-copper-mining-trends-zambia/

2

contamination of copper and cobalt elements, resulting in acid drainage and metal absorption in
the province’s streams and rivers.4
Moreover, chemical spillage and leakages into the main water bodies in the rural areas
surrounding the mining townships has created a serious food security threat, as farmers are
unable to safely irrigate their crops or water their animals, and the food produced on the
contaminated land endangers biodiversity, the health of both human and animal life, and affects
residents’ economic livelihood.5 Frequent leakage of contaminants around rivers has forced
many native settlers to abandon their ancestral lands and relocate to safer places.6 This was the
case in the village of Shimulala in Chingola town, where the mining giant Vedanta’s subsidiary
company KCM spilled toxic waste into the Mushishima stream, turning the water into a river of
acid. In 2010, KCM drilled a borehole to provide clean water for the village, but a leaked
document shows that the water from the borehole is also contaminated.7
These undesirable ecological and social issues which are intrinsically linked with mining have
serious implications for the economic growth and development of the nation. In Zambia, there
are approximately 10 functioning copper mines, with 17 international companies and over 87
local contractors. Several of these companies have come into operation by way of mergers, thus
multiplying the scale of their actions into other provinces in the country, namely North-western,

4

SGAB, SWECO, THOMRO and UNZA. (2005). Preparation of Phase 2 of a Consolidated Environmental Management Plan –
Project Summary Report. ZCCM Investments Holdings, Copper belt Environment Project.
5 Ibid.
5 Vidal, John. "'I Drank the Water and Ate the Fish. We All Did. The Acid Has Damaged Me Permanently'" The Observer. 2015.
Accessed December 07, 2016. https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2015/aug/01/zambia-vedanta-pollutionvillage-copper-mine.
5 "Chamber of Mines of Zambia » Production Figures." Chamber of Mines of Zambia. Accessed December 07, 2016.
http://mines.org.zm/production-figures/.
6 Ibid.
7 Vidal, John. "'I Drank the Water and Ate the Fish. We All Did. The Acid Has Damaged Me Permanently'" The Observer. 2015.
Accessed December 07, 2016. https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2015/aug/01/zambia-vedanta-pollutionvillage-copper-mine.
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Eastern, Southern and Central Provinces.8 The activities of these companies have also affected
local livelihoods and environmental conservation efforts.
This thesis explores the impact of large scale copper mining on the environment and the
distribution of its benefits. This will be achieved using the Copper Belt Province as a case study.
The Copper Belt Province of Zambia is one of the nation’s largest copper ore producing
provinces, with six active copper mines dating as far back as 1928.9 This study will use a
political ecological framework to show that Zambia’s mineral resource wealth has produced a
sequence of economic and political realignments arising from the operations of the copper
mining industry that has subsequently negatively impacted the local environment and the
communities who live in, and depend upon it.
1.2 Formulation and Background Context
The Republic of Zambia is endowed with many minerals such uranium, gold, emeralds, zinc,
coal, cobalt and amethyst, to name but a few.10 Nevertheless, the nation is principally reliant on
the large-scale extraction of copper for its export earnings, tax revenue and direct and indirect
employment opportunities. Commercial copper mining in Zambia started in the late 1920s; thus,
the country has a long history of copper mining activities. At independence in October 1964,
Zambia’s Gross National Product per capita was one of the highest on the continent, mainly due

8

"Chamber of Mines of Zambia » Production Figures." Chamber of Mines of Zambia. Accessed December 07, 2016.
http://mines.org.zm/production-figures/.
9 Ibid.
10 “Sustainable Development in Zambia: Experiences and Ways Forward,”
http://www.ias.unu.edu/sub_page.aspx?catID=107&ddlID=207. Accessed. 9/7/2016
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to the copper mining industry, which in 1960 accounted for 90% of its total export earnings11 and
contributed 16% of wage employment.12
Unfortunately, the nation’s reliance on copper has made her a mono-economy, primarily
dependent on the export of one major natural resource to generate government revenue and earn
foreign exchange.13 In an increasingly global economy and marketplace, mining companies are
not limited to domestic markets; rather, they are constantly searching for future potential markets
to boost their revenues. This globalization of the mining industry affects copper production in
Zambia owing to its reliance on foreign direct investment, technological transfer, and enhanced
trade opportunities beyond domestic borders.14
Multinational corporations (MNC) play a huge role in Zambia’s mining industry, because they
operate on a global scale with major activities and strategies centrally determined by their boards
in developed countries. Multinational corporations such as the Anglo-Swiss company Glencore,
First Quantum Minerals Ltd of Canada and the London-based Indian founded mining company
of Vedanta Resources plc are able to mobilise capital investment resources which often far
exceed the annual GDP of emerging nations like Malawi, Lesotho and Zambia. As the academic
scholar Todaro15 has observed, “Their capital security gain has permitted MNCs to increase their
economic and political strength in emerging nations through product market supremacy, thus
conferring upon them the ability to manipulate prices and incomes and to conspire with other
firms in limiting access by other potential players.”16 In the case of Zambia, the influence of

11

Osei-Hwedie, Z, B. Development Policy and Economic Change in Zambia: A Re-Assessment, 2003
Daniel, Philip. Africanization, Nationalization and Inequality: Mining Labor and the Copper Belt in Zambian Development.
Cambridge University Press, London, 1979.
13 Osei-Hwedie, Z, B. Development Policy and Economic Change in Zambia: A Re-Assessment, 2003
14 Ibid.
15 Todaro, M. (1985), Economic Development in the Third World, New York, pp 50-180
16 Ibid.
12
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these mega-sized MNCs cannot be overstated. The mismanagement of Zambia’s copper
resources by the State-owned Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines (ZCCM) ltd. in the 1970s and
80s was one of the key factors leading to over nearly two decades of neo-liberal economic
policies and strategies from the early late 1990s that saw private industry-led growth as the main
path towards recovery from the economic crisis arising from the socialist economic policies of
the one-party state that came to an end in 1991. Zambia, like many other nations that
implemented structural adjustment program (SAP) reforms from the latter part of the 20th
century, was forced to privatize industries such as mining by selling the state-owned copper
mines. The Zambian government implemented policies and enacted legislation aimed at
enhancing private foreign direct investment in the mining industry, and multinational
corporations were awarded concessions and obtained mining licenses for huge portions of land,
rich in natural ores for exploration and extraction.
Despite enormous investments in the mining sector after the privatization of the mines, the
benefits accruing to the majority in the nation are scarcely noticeable. The claims of inclusive
growth for which the government sold the mines are farfetched with the benefits largely reaped
by the shareholders and executives of the MNCs and a small local elite. Although Zambia is
today classified as a middle-income country,17 on many measures it is paradoxically one of the
poorest nations in the world, with 79.6 % of the population living below the income poverty line
of US $1.25 per day.18 There have in recent times since privatization, been periods of relative
economic development; but this has been far from inclusive development and current mining
operations have impacted negatively upon the natural environment and livelihoods that depend

17

UNDP (2011) ‘Sustainability and Equity: A Better Future for All’ Explanatory note on 2011 Human Development Report
composite indices
18 Ibid.
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upon it. Part of the reason for increased ecological degradation in the nation relates to procedures
used by the government when granting mining licences and concessions in Zambia. There has
been little to no consultation with the public, local communities or other interested stakeholders
on matters pertaining to “proposals, purchases, environment management and mining rights, the
result being no local informed input on the potential of mining exploration developments will
influence upon the environment.”19
Currently, major shareholders in the Zambian mines industry include Mopani Copper Mines Plc.,
owned by Carissa Investments (jointly Glencore and First Quantum of Canada; the latter
invested $3 billion dollars into the former ZCCM holdings);20 Kokoda Copper Mines, a
subsidiary of Vendata Plc., which invested $8 billion dollars into the mines; J&W of
Switzerland, which also owns Chambeshi Metals Plc., with Chibuluma Copper Mines subsidiary
owned through the South African giant firm Metorex, which invested a sum of $406 million
dollars in the mines.21
The overdependence on copper by Zambia has been made more serious by the nation being a
“price taker” on the London Metal Exchange. Copper produced by the nation is sold on
international trade platforms such as the London Metal Exchange (LME), which sets the copper
price per global supply and demand conditions. As investor perceptions about these conditions
can change rapidly, the LME’s copper price is infamous for its limited period instability. In just
the first two weeks of November 2016, the price has spiked by over 20% to in excess of US

19

Garvin, T., Mcgee, T.K., Smoyer, Tomic, K. E. and Aubynn, E.A. (2009) “Community-company relations in gold mining in
Ghana,” Journal of Environmental Management, Vol. 90: 571-586
20 World Investment Report 2007. Accessed December 08, 2016.
http://unctad.org/en/pages/PublicationArchive.aspx?publicationid=724
21 Ibid.
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$5,600 a ton, from about $1000 less a month earlier.22 The outcome of this price instability is
unpredictability and volatility in Zambia’s foreign exchange earnings and government tax
revenue from copper.
As the Zambian copper mining sector is inextricably linked to the global capitalist system, it is
inevitably exposed to the manner in which this system operates. Its predominant motivation is
the maximization of returns to shareholders, often achieved by “price taking” companies like
mining companies by the minimization of costs. Thus, for example, wage levels for local miners
are kept as low as possible. Further, particularly pertinent in the context of this paper, when a
conflict arises between minimizing costs and enhancing environmental safeguards through costly
adjustments to processes and installations, the natural tendency of a capitalist firm is to cut
corners to protect the bottom line. This is even more likely in the case of the modern MNC
where the line between corporate management and the shareholders has become very blurred.
Thus, the CEO of Glencore since 2002 has been Ivan Glasenburg. He has benefitted enormously
from his large holdings of Glencore stock. In this context, the operational decisions taken by
such a stock holding CEO and his directors are even more likely to put the maximization of
returns to shareholders above any costly investments in environmental protection measures.
Indeed, they are only likely to do so if required and effectively compelled to by the Governments
in whose countries their mines and smelters operate.
1.3 Research Objectives
The study seeks to explore the impact that copper mining in Zambia has made on the
environment by enriching or just preserving and conserving it on the one hand or rather

22

"Copper Price Rises." Zambia Daily Mail Copper Price Rises Comments. Accessed December 08, 2016. https://www.dailymail.co.zm/?p=72823 .
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impoverishing and degrading it on the other. To do this, the study will consider the following
specific objectives.
1. To investigate how mining operations in the Copper Belt Province have impacted local
social and environmental conditions.
2. To assess the financial gains from copper mining and how the revenue from copper
mining is distributed among the various interested parties, stakeholders and recognized
participants.
3. To comprehend and critically examine the policy framework established to foster
environmentally sustainable extraction of copper in Zambia, and make recommendations
that will strengthen this framework for the future promotion of an environmentally
sustainable copper mining industry.

1.4 Research Questions
To achieve the above objectives, the following major research questions were posed:
1. What are the political and economic factors influencing the scale, scope and distribution
of the benefits accruing from copper mining in Zambia?
2. What are the types and distribution of environmental impacts associated with copper
mining in Zambia?
3. What kind of environmental conservation and preservation policies and strategies have
emerged to mitigate the environmental impact of copper mining in Zambia?
1.5 Significance of the Study
Copper is a commodity utilized in a wide range of sectors due to its chemical and physical
properties. This study was undertaken to produce data on the influence that mining activities

9

have on the environment and local communities in Zambia. In explaining the effects of
environmental degradation, the study results can potentially be used by various stakeholders
including the government, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), the church and the private
sector as well other international partners, to amend economic-environmental practices
pertaining to mitigating water contamination and soil and air pollution.
Given that the Zambian government has ratified various international agreements and
declarations such as the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDG’s) - which include
SDG number 3 (“Good health and Wellbeing”), SDG number 6 (“Clean Water and Sanitation”)
and SDG number 11 (Sustainable Cities and Communities) - , this research study would avail the
Government of Zambia with the opportunity to implement these declarations domestically by
working hand in hand with mining companies to develop environmentally sustainable strategies.
The information gathered would furthermore support interventions by various government
ministries and agencies (i.e. Ministry of Community Development as well as the Ministry of
Mines and Minerals Development). The research may also contribute to the existing knowledge
of mining activities and their impact on the environment, by aiding other academicians and
researchers to build on the existing literature to strengthen social and civic policy appraisal and
execution modalities. Communities at the local level must demand improved social corporate
responsibility, and grassroots advocacy may empower them to apply the existing study results in
demanding dialogue and participatory decision making on aspects related to mining in Zambia,
especially as it relate to the distribution of benefits and the efforts to mitigate all negative
environmental footprints of mining.

10

1.6 Limitations of the Study
This research had several restrictions. First, the study is constrained in scope as it is concentrated
on one study area—the Zambian Copper Belt Province; therefore, it offers restrictions for
broader scale generalization. In addition, it does not incorporate the successes and generally
albeit inequitable economic effects of the mining industry, but instead studies the influence of
copper mining on the environment and how the environment and local communities have been
negatively impacted because of copper mining activities.
Second, a major limitation of the work related to the researcher’s inability to travel to the study
site (the Copper Belt Province, Zambia) owing to financial and immigration restrictions. This in
turn impacted the overall direction of the study, as the researcher had to rely upon existing
research conducted and published by other scholars, limiting his investigative inquiry (especially
in gathering information from key informants and other participants through in-depth
interviews). However, with perseverance, the research was conducted. A third limitation was the
difficulty of gathering literature reviews within a restricted time frame; this in turn had
inferences for the theoretical depth of the investigation.
1.7 Structure of the Thesis
The study consists of five chapters. This first chapter presents the introduction of the study by
covering the contextual background of the issue under investigation, addresses the statement of
the problem, research objectives and questions and furthermore provides the justification for, and
limitations of, the investigation. The second chapter reviews Political Ecology’s origins and
development; it also highlights the significance of the conceptual framework adopted for this
study, by linking the study to the debate. The chapter then discusses methods and data collection
tools used for the case study site. Chapter three begins by outlining both the political and
11

economic background of Zambia, and how these two aspects have influenced copper mining
production in the nation. Chapter four covers an overview of environmental assessment of
Copper Mining by setting out a thorough description of copper production processes, debates the
actors and policies involved in environmental protection, before, discussing specific pollutants
that originate from the Zambian copper mines and smelters. Finally, chapter five deliberates on
the findings, implications and makes appropriate conclusions and recommendations.

12

CHAPTER TWO: Research Framework

2.1 Political Ecology: Origins and Development
This study will use a political ecology framework to analyze the environmental impact of copper
mining in Zambia, from considerations of power (policy and practice) to how the environment
and communities have changed at local level. It shows how the distribution of power (which is
the main subject of political science) determines the use of the natural environment between
different categories and groups of humans and with regard to other species.23
The development of political ecology as a field of study and as an analytical framework arose in
response to the need to analyze the dynamics of change in human ecosystems, emerging first as a
subsidiary field of geography in the mid-late 1960s. The discussion of issues covered in political
ecology grew out of a very large number of disjointed works from several disciplines, including
geography, sociology, anthropology, biology, and ecology.24 The application of a political
ecology perspective has been instrumental in assisting scholars to comprehend how and why the
costs and beneﬁts related to changes in ecology and the environment that arise from human
activity are unevenly dispersed among humans according to the economic and political power
they are able to exercise.25 The field has greatly expanded to include discussions on a wide range
of environmental problems such as loss of topsoil, disposal of nuclear waste, global population

23

Robbins P. Political Ecology: A Critical Introduction .2nd ed. Chichester: John Wiley & Sons Ltd; 2012, 296.
Brown, J. Christopher, and Mark Purcell. "There’s nothing inherent about scale: Political ecology, the local trap, and the
politics of development in the Brazilian Amazon." Geoforum 36, no. 5 (2005): 607-624.
25 Ibid.
24
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growth, global warming, ozone depletion, depletion of global fisheries, species extinction,
desertification, environmentally-related illness, acid rain, and decline in air and water quality.26
One approach to political ecology joins human ecology (largely, the study of human social
existence and habitat) with a social and political examination, i.e. how distinct groups of players
at diverse scales challenge the rights of other players to revenues and other benefits from an
economic activity that uses natural resources in a predominantly ecological setting.27 The
overriding necessity for access and control over land, space and ecological resources, 28 suggests
that power relationships are key to the political ecology method—specifically, the central
attention it gives to its political analysis regarding the insatiable need for humans to use natural
resources.29 An examination of “scale” (physical, financial, information, political, social) in
political ecology deepens an understanding of the resource curse30, which is the failure of many
resource-rich nations to benefit significantly, sustainably and equitably from their natural
resource capital, and for their governments to respond effectively to the public welfare and
economic empowerment requirements of their citizens. Thus, for example, because of poor
public administration and governance in many developing countries and unfair trade practices
between unevenly balanced nations in a globalised capitalist world, the MNCs from rich nations
can extract concessions such as tax breaks for their mining activities, reducing the public finance
benefits of being a natural resource rich country. There are very few African nations that have

26

Https://loyno.academia.edu/JohnClark. "Dialectical Political Ecology" Academia.edu-Share Research. Accessed December 09,
2016. https://www.academia.edu/2937823/_Dialectical_Political_Ecology.
27 Brosius JP. Comments to A. Escob-after nature: steps to an anti-essentialist political ecology. Cur Anthropol 1999, 40:16-17.
28 Tan-Mullins, M. 2007, "The State and its Agencies in Coastal Resources Management: the political ecology of fisheries
management in Pattani, Southern Thailand", Singapore Journal of Tropical Ecology, vol. 28, no. 3, pp. 898-918.
29 Swyngedouw, E. 2007, "Techno-natural Revolutions: the scalar politics of Franc's hydro-social dream for Spain, 1939-75",
Transactions of the British Institute of British Geographers NS, vol. 32, no. 1, pp. 9-28.
30 Neumann, R. 2009, "Political Ecology: Theorizing Scale", Progress in Human Geography, vol. 33, no. 3, pp. 398-406.
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gained sustainable and equitable development from their possession and exploitation of their
mineral resources.31
The scholarship on mining raises huge concerns in attempting to comprehend environmental and
individual livelihood sustainability. It is evident that the political ecology of mining has a
combined appeal where biophysical and social/political conditions are intimately entangled.
From this standpoint, it can be seen that the mining industry in emerging countries operated
overwhelmingly and disproportionately in the direction of those who have power through their
control over huge capital resources.
Power is said to be “the capacity of a performer to regulate their own synergy with the
environment and the cooperation of other performers with the environment.”32 Power may be
derived from the State, individuals and organisations alike. The exercise of power inevitably
results in an uneven relationship between different groups and performers and, as a consequence,
affects environmental outcomes. The exercise of power invariably favours the specific interests
of those with power over other less powerful players, so dominating their legitimate interests in
preserving and using ecological resources to advance their own interests. In the case of mining,
land ownership and control in areas rich in mineral resources is invariably directed toward
conferring commercial mining rights to powerful MNCs over enabling local smallholder farmers
to continue to have access to that land for the raising of crops and animals. This result is
manifested when the powerful party’s control of the ecological and natural resources is
consolidated through regulation and intervention by the State to prioritize their activities over
those of less powerful groups. Thus, these vulnerable groups are side-lined in policy formulation

31

Molle, F. 2007, "Scale and Power in River Basin Management: the Chayo Phraya River in Thailand," The Geographical Journal,
vol. 173, no. 4, pp. 731-753.
32 Bryant, R. L. and Bailey, S. (1997) Third World Political Ecology, Routledge Publications, London. P 39
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and implementation and indeed are often abandoned, usually facing the future with increased
difficulty as their source of livelihood is no longer available to them.33
In the case of Zambian copper mining, as in many other emerging nations where natural
resources are extracted, the “resource curse” is apparent. The “resource curse” postulates that
possession of mineral resources does not always lead to sustainable and equitable development
for the majority of the citizens of a resource rich nation. Indeed, in most cases they have turned
out to be curses rather than blessings in that they breed corruption and rent-seeking behaviour by
state officials, delay the adoption of more broad-based development strategies that can produce
equitable economic growth and expose the nation to significant external shocks as a result of
highly volatile commodity prices. There are so many influential and powerful players in resource
rich countries - such as highly capitalised and profit maximising multinational mining companies
(MNCs), the State and its rent-seeking officials and other local elites (e.g. traditional leaders)
who can be subverted into supporting the interests of the MNCs such that these MNCs take away
a disproportionate share of the nation’s treasure. The local people and their communities are left
to cope with the negative effects of mining these resources, including alienation from the
benefits they traditionally received from the land, leading to greater material hardship and
insecurity and a life lived in a degraded natural environment. In some cases, like that of the
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and previously in Angola with the UNITA rebels,
conflict over their resources (diamonds) lead to political and social unrest and conflicts and the
loss of life for many hundreds of thousands of people.34. These battles originated from disputes
over income streams, scuffles over area dominance, inequitable access to ecological resources,
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failure to protect human and citizen rights and disapproval of individuals and groups over the
distribution of mineral rentals.35
Political ecology, like many other philosophical concepts and analytical frameworks, has not
advanced far without having its own challenges and detractors within academic circles, largely
emanating from the high level of ambiguity that exists when it comes to defining and classifying
what political ecology is and what it means. Some scholars have argued that it is simply a study
plan;36 awkwardly enough, others have called it a method.37 Some address it as a standpoint,38
with others calling it a training method.39
2.2 Conceptual Framework
The broader political economy has been further explained in terms of political ecology by Piers
Blaikie in The Political Economy of Soil Erosion in Developing Countries.40 This work both
elaborates the political discussion of soil erosion’s causes and impacts and recognizes the diverse
social contexts in which soil erosion is considered problematic.41 Blaikie’s work uses chains of
explanation at multiple scales; it acknowledges various root causes of degradation, and examines
the social and institutional impacts on environmental knowledge itself.42
This framework sheds light on pertinent issues associated with mining, for example, the effect of
local inequalities on land use and land degradation such as reduced access to land ownership due
to over population, increased pressure from other industrial sectors in need of land (i.e.
35
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commercial agriculture, cattle rearing and urban growth development). Multiple scales of
analysis provide different types of information on societal and environmental processes that
operate at different scales, thus a multi-scale approach is necessary to fully understand trends and
their causes. Blaikie applied the multi-scale approach to the case of Luangwa National Park, in
Eastern Zambia, using land-based research methods (See Figure 1).
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Figure 1: Blaikie & Brookfield’s Multi-Scale Approach Framework (Blaikie 1995: 2008)

2.3 Linkage to Study
This research focuses on the effects of copper mining on local communities and on the
environment in the Copper Belt Province of Zambia. The use of both a political ecology
framework and the concept of multiple scale analysis will provide a better comprehension of
how copper mining operations influence environmental outcomes in the local countryside and
communities, keeping in mind their interaction with power dynamics as they operate at different

18

levels. Both the theory and concept of political ecology will be useful in understanding how
environmental strategies are carved out.
2.4 Methods and Data Collection
The study involved the collection of secondary data in an effort find answers to the paper’s
research questions. The secondary data used has been critically assessed to validate the
credibility and reliability of key official documents, publications, reports and various internet
sourced articles. The paper focuses on a case study of the Copper Belt Province of Zambia,
examining the impact of large scale copper mining on the environment and surrounding
communities, as well as observing the environmental policies put in place to curtail negative
social and environment effects.
2.5 Research Methods
Qualitative methods have a descriptive capability based on primary and unstructured data,43 and
are an effective method for studies of a liberal nature such as sociology. Gunnarson44 contends
that the advantage of applying a qualitative technique in research is that it takes into
consideration the overall picture, objectively observing variables in their natural habitats. A
primarily qualitative approach was therefore selected over a more quantitative method as the
proper approach to guide this research, focusing on how copper mining in Zambia is either
empowering or impoverishing the environment and the people in it.

2.6 Relevant Literature
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Project-related documents such as relevant Environmental Impact Assessments (EIA), reports
from the Copper Belt Environment Project (CEP),45 the Government of Zambia’s Consolidated
Environmental Management Plan (CEMP) and its related Legislative Action Plan and Social
Impact Assessment Report (ESIA) were also used as references. Other Government progress
reports, reports of non-government organizations and other academic articles on the mining
sector were also referred to.
2.7 Case Study Methods
Bryman and Bell46 (2007) state that a case study methodology comprises a thorough and
demanding examination of one or more cases, critically analyzing the extent of the case. The use
of case studies cuts across a variety of academic fields and disciplines such as in anthropology,
ethnography, geography, politics, philosophy and scientific research. Nevertheless, there are
limitations when it comes to using a case study design. Given that one case scenario does not fit
all other cases, it may create bias towards showcasing a certain group or situation. However, the
drive for use of this technique is not to oversimplify the results of other cases or larger
communities;47 rather, it is intended draw attention to those specific cases, examine their
distinguishing settings and to generate an outline for dialogue on the issue.

2.8 Choice of Copper Belt Province as Case Study
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The “copper belt” runs through northern Zambia and southern Democratic Republic of Congo. In
the 2010 census, the population of the Copper Belt Province of Zambia was 1,972,317.48 The
urban population was 376,861; rural was 1,595,456.49 The Copper Belt Province is an ideal casestudy given the province’s large-scale mining activity, both currently and in colonial days.
Mining has been identified as the chief source of most of the water, air and soil pollution in the
province due to the extraction and processing of copper and cobalt ores. This provides a defined
area in which to study the impact of mining on the environment and the local communities, and
how environmental conservation efforts are being designed and implemented. Also, as a former
long-term resident of Copper Belt Province, the researcher has first-hand experience of the
mining industry’s impact on the environment and on local communities.
Even though there are about six large scale mines in the province, there have not been enough
impact studies undertaken despite the vast and long-standing environmental problems they have
caused. This provided the author with an opening to investigate copper mining in the province in
depth, and attempt to disentangle the sensitivities and uncertainties felt by those close to mining
operations, as well as to contribute to the body of work with regard to mining in the Copper belt
Province.

48

"2010 Census Final Population and Electoral Information." Accessed December 11, 2016.
http://www.zamstats.gov.zm/report/Census/2010/Provincial/2010 Summary Census Wall Chart-Copper belt Province.pdf.
49 Ibid.

21

Figure 2: Map of Zambia highlighting Copper Belt Province50

Figure 3: Copper belt Province Mining Locations51
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Map. B shows the major Copperbelt mining towns, as geographically located on the map of Zambia. The map
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CHAPTER 3: Overview of the Political Economy in Zambia
3.1 Introduction
For over half a century after her independence from Great Britain, Zambia continues to
encounter severe problems including persistently high poverty rates, poor land administration,
inadequate public service delivery, high pollution levels in mining areas and inadequate capacity
to manage her environmental and natural resources. This chapter presents a historical and
contextual background of Zambia’s political economy with a description of the political and
economic influences that have shaped the governance and administration of Zambia.

Figure 4 Timeline: Political and Economic History of Zambia
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3.2 The Political Economy of Zambia
In the early 1960s, Zambia was ranked as a middle-income country, with vast economic growth
potential; presently, despite huge mineral resources, the country was ranked a low 139th in the
world in terms of the Human Development Index of the United Nations in 2014. Zambia is a
land-locked country surrounded by seven neighboring countries: Angola, Botswana, the
Democratic Republic of Congo, Mozambique, Namibia, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe.
Geographically positioned in central Southern Africa, it is 753,000 km2 (291,000 square miles)
in size, a little larger than Texas. Farming potential is relatively high due to favorable climatic
conditions and rainfall patterns. Nevertheless, like many other nations in the sub-Saharan region,
Zambia’s economy remains heavily dependent on the mining sector and trade, and there is a
relative neglect of other high potential sectors such as agriculture, tourism and agro-processing.
Large scale copper mining has been the engine of development for the country since the 1920s,
initially laying the foundation favorable for investment in industry and developing an
industrialized society.52
When mining exploration activities began under the administration of the British South African
Corporation in 1921, the company invested massive capital resources into Zambia’s first
commercial copper mines. However, prior to the mining operations, Zambia had remained
scarcely populated, with the only commercial interest in the nation being access to slave labor.
Slave traders exploited the area by selling slaves to rich southern groups in South Africa and
Mashonaland (present-day Zimbabwe).53
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Following the discovery of large deposits of copper ore, white settlers started arriving in large
numbers, with little or no initial supporting investment in infrastructure. Men from all corners of
Zambia, who prior to the opening of the mines had mainly lived in rural areas, engaged in the
barter system of trade (exchange of goods), and had a subsistence fishing and an agri-pastoral
economic livelihood, started migrating to the mining areas to find work. Huge investments were
poured into the copper mining sector, encouraging urbanization, with urban areas being the
central economic wealth zones leaving the rural areas economically backward. Investment in
rural Zambia was chiefly along the rail line between the Copper belt and southern provinces, and
was merely for enhancing transportation networks to facilitate swift exportation of minerals to
export markets in neighboring countries with access to seaports.
This divide between rural and urban development persists today, strongly influenced by
tribalism, mining and urban political power. It is a defining characteristic of Zambia’s economic
growth path. Given her endowment of abundant lands and mineral wealth, and despite
urbanization, a significant population still lives in rural areas, limiting their access to markets,
public services and transportation.54 Even in urban areas, the majority of the people live in
densely populated shanty compounds with inadequate housing and social amenities. Very little
progress has been made when it comes to the equitable distribution of national resources, even
though the nation has undergone several different forms of government administration and
leadership.55 During the last three decades, Zambia has experienced five distinct policy
regimes.56

54

Ibid.
Ibid.
56 World Bank. 2004. Zambia: Country Economic Memorandum. World Bank, Washington, D.C.
55

25

3.3 Zambia’s Unsuccessful Economic Interventions: 1965-1990
Zambia’s first President, Kenneth Kaunda, initially embarked on an economic strategy that
favoured the fortunes of private sector companies like the Anglo-American Corporation that
were engaged in the mining sector in what was - in the first years after independence fundamentally a market economy.57 Mining and urban towns were significantly favored over
agriculture and the rural areas because of an import substitution policy funded by revenues from
rising copper exports58. Thus, very few Zambians benefited from foreign investment in mining,
specifically those that were located in rural areas, even at a time (1964-72) when the nation’s
gross domestic product (GDP) increased at 5.1%59 (see Figure 5). The economic gap between the
rich and the poor was widened, and increased in the decades that followed.60

Figure 5. Real GDP and Population Growth, 1965-200161
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Under the Mulungushi Economic Reforms announced on 19th April 1968, the Zambian
Government began to dismantle the market economy and the private sector owned mines
themselves were nationalized in 1972 ending the period of market-driven economic policies. At
the same time, the Constitution was changed and the country left multi-party democracy behind
and embarked on a “One-party participatory democracy” – effectively a one-party State under
Kenneth Kaunda and his United National Independence Party (UNIP).
The economic, financial and political power that came with being in control of the mining sector
was enormous, especially because it generated a large proportion of the nation’s foreign
exchange and tax revenue. The mine workers were among the most well paid and politically
active groups of employees in the country, given the role that the mining sector trade unions
played in demanding improved worker conditions and increased wages, sometimes accompanied
with threats of nationwide boycotts and strikes against the State.
Inequality gaps between urban dwellers and rural dwellers, created when the copper mines were
nationalized, was further increased by the newly-adopted socialist policies that the Kaunda
administration implemented with the goal of supporting nationalized businesses including the
mines. This switch in policy orientation from a market economy to a socialist economic stance
coincided with the global recession of the early 1970s, triggered by the oil price increases
engineered by the cartel of oil producing countries – OPEC. The recession hit the commodity
markets, and global copper prices fell. As a result, Zambia’s foreign exchange earnings and tax
revenues fell rapidly and government began to borrow heavily in an attempt to maintain its
spending programmes. However, the fast development of the late 1960s ended. As the recession,
prolonged throughout the 1970s, export incomes and tax revenues continued to dwindle and a
serious fiscal crisis developed as the Kaunda administration became more and more indebted.
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Unsure if the recession was momentary, they failed to make reasonable accommodations to
address the matter, (e.g. limiting spending on its subsidies and holding back on salary increments
for government workers). Instead, the government borrowed, unsustainably raising its foreign
debt.
Increased pressure was placed on the Kaunda administration as the growth in the nation’s GDP
fell precipitously becoming negative in several years in the 1980s. For most of this decade, there
was lack of real political will to make the necessary fiscal and economic adjustments and
eventually meant that the government was forced to begin to implement “structural adjustment”
policies by the two Bretton Woods Institutions i.e. the World Bank (WB) and the International
Monetary Fund (IMF).
Until these policies were started, subsidies and consumer price controls protected most of the
urban population from the effects of the recession. Further, a scheme of import licensing
supported the mining industry, other nationalized industries and state owned ventures, in that
they were favoured when it came to access to the country’s dwindling foreign exchange reserves.
This meant that there was little practical encouragement to diversify and invest in other
productive sectors, so despite all the economic policy intervention efforts, the economy
staggered and remained indifferent to the strategies introduced.
The first adjustment program with IMF backing was introduced in the early 1980s when the state
began to admit policy failures. Immediately, a plan of action to stabilize the economy was
implemented through a structural adjustment program (SAP). Stabilization was achieved to a
certain extent through better macroeconomic steadiness, but unfortunately, the lack of
enthusiasm from the government to see though all policy outcomes contributed to economic
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decline.62 Because of the nation’s inability to implement the SAP and maintain economic
stability, by the mid-1980s subsidies included 20% of the economic budget, whereas prices
controls for the products of a wide number of nationalized businesses made them uneconomic
and in desperate need of cross-subsidization from the falling revenues from the mines.63
Following the cancellation intervene reform agreements by Kaunda’s government in 1983, the
government entered a second SAP aimed at reducing price controls and a general reduction of
tariffs. The second SAP had a broader scope, recognizing the need to diversify and invest in
other sectors including agriculture. Like earlier attempts, the success of the program was
dependent on the support of the elite and urban dwellers. This led to civil unrest over food prices,
and in urban towns in the Copper Belt Province, residents protested and threatened to
disempower the government, specifically interest groups within the mining sector and in
particular the trade unions.
As the foreign debt payments accumulated, and fearing losing popularity, the government gave in
to the escalating political and economic forces by backpedaling on the IMF supported SAP.
Indeed, in 1987, the Government cut ties with the two Bretton Woods Institutions and tries to go
it alone though its own economic programme which it called “Growth from Own Resources”.
Inflation grew and the situation became politically volatile in the Copper belt.
The economic reform policies introduced in the 1980s had some effect on restoring macroeconomic balance but political support was always lukewarm and while the reforms appeared to
be effective momentarily and, for a while, the financial system and economy was responsive
toward growth, by 1985, the economy took a slump, and entered a recession in 1989. Political
62

Bigsten, A. and Kayizzi-Mugerwa, S. 2000. The Political Economy of Policy Failure in Zambia. Working Papers in Economics,
Department of Economics, Göteborg University.
63 Osei-Hwedie, B.Z. 2003. “Development Policy and Economic Change in Zambia: A Reassessment.” DPMF Bulletin, Vol. X(2).
Development Policy Management Forum, Ethiopia.

29

debate and unrest mounted against Kaunda’s one party State – especially from the Zambia
Congress of Trade Unions – ZCTU – led by Fredrick Chiluba, as communism collapsed in the
Soviet Union and Eastern Europe and while inflation in Zambia spiraled following the rapid
depreciation of the Zambian currency – the Kwacha.
It was becoming clear by 1990 that the one-party State and the socialist leaning policies
implemented by Kaunda’s party UNIP (United National Independence Party) were ineffective in
addressing the dire economic condition of the country. Kaunda was forced to re-establish multiparty politics and hold multi-party elections in 1991 after a new Constitution was enacted earlier
that year. Kaunda’s “Growth from Own Resources” economic programme quickly unraveled as
the government backpedaled on the reforms. The maize and fertilizer subsidies were enhanced,
the allocation of foreign currency through a “distribution pipeline” managed by the Bank of
Zambia lengthened, and civil service wages were increased to gain political mileage in the run
up to the November 1991 general elections.64 The consequence of this was the further loss of
donor confidence by the bi-lateral donor countries, who, following the Bretton Woods
Institutions, pulled out their support for the government, owing to its breach of commitment to
attaining economic reform and recovery.
Assessing the developments throughout this period, where the UNIP government maintained
economic and political control of the nation for nearly three decades, copper dependence turned
out to be a source of fiscal instability and ensured that the economy was always susceptible to
external shocks. The economic quagmire into which Zambia increasingly became immured in
the 1980s up to 1991 was the major factor in the UNIP government’s loss of political dominance
in the country. In addition, the State’s administration and control of mining revenue and foreign
64
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exchange created a powerful political elite who were nevertheless reliant on the copper mining
sector for political support. Consequently, they developed many strategies aimed at appeasing
urban residents in general, and the miners through broadly accepted fiscal entitlements (i.e.
subsidies ranging from food to housing) financed from mineral profits, as opposed to using those
resources to finance programmes and policies that promoted long term growth for both urban and
rural areas.
The national budget and Zambia’s fiscal position had become progressively unsustainable since
the mid-1970s, being the major victim of falling global copper prices with a growing dependence
on donor assistance to finance an ever-widening fiscal deficit. With no donor support or no
international financial institution willing to loan to the State from the latter part of the 1980s
because of the president’s socialist approach to growth, which he called ‘humanism’, the future
of the one-party State became untenable. The inadequate mineral export revenues and the
government’s inability to take long term measures to diversify into agriculture and other
productive sectors were among the leading causes of persistently high rates of poverty and
considerable income disparity between a small urban elite and the majority who lived in periurban shanty compounds and the rural areas. By 1991, the dwindling proceeds from the
country’s copper exports had negatively impacted the Government’s social expenditure
programmes primarily aimed at appeasing the urban population – especially in the mining towns
on the Copperbelt. Rationing of basic goods and services became the order of the day because of
the dearth of foreign exchange and the underdevelopment of the industrial and agricultural
sectors, leading people to demand for political change two decades after the country became a
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one-party state in the early 1970s.65
3.4 Structural Adjustment Reforms under the MMD since 1991
The opposition Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD), led by Frederick Chiluba, the
former leader of the powerful Zambia Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) which had
spearheaded opposition to Kaunda’s one party State and socialist economic policies won the
elections in November 1991. The MMD ran on a progressive economic platform and quickly reengaged support from the international community, particularly the IMF and World Bank. This
support was given on the basis of a promise to embark on a thorough structural adjustment
programme (called the Economic Recovery Programme - ERP) modelled on the typical
“Washington Consensus” model with a further commitment to transparent and responsible
administration.66 The new Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) party comprised a
diverse alliance of intellectuals, business interests, students and trade unions that were
enthusiastic about bringing a different style of leadership from its predecessor UNIP. Still, the
new government was passed a poisoned chalice in the form of an unstable and stagnant economy
based on an ailing copper sector, a three-figure inflation rate which had the potential to spiral
into hyper-inflation, a high foreign debt burden and a depreciating currency, unemployment and
under-employment for a rapidity growing and young population, low productivity especially in
the mines and parastatal sectors which dominated the economy, increased poverty and large
disparities in income and wealth.
The new SAP was designed with the aim of restoring macro-economic stability and arresting the
economic malaise and decline. Implementation of the SAP immediately began winning back
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donor confidence, with international donors supporting Zambia with close to US$1.5 billion in
1992, reaching its all-time peak. The MMD’s SAP, like similar programmes across Sub-Saharan
Africa at the time, was a full blown “Washington Consensus” SAP which included restoring
macroeconomic equilibrium; public sector reform; liberalization of the foreign exchange market
and domestic product markets; the sale of nationalized industries and businesses; and
agricultural sector reforms.67
3.4.1 Macroeconomic Equilibrium
During the transition from a one-party State to multi-party politics, Zambia experienced a
record high inflation rate – reaching an annual rate of 127% in 1993, the highest it had ever
been since Independence. During this period, following the liberalization of the exchange rate,
the Zambian kwacha experienced rapid depreciation and interest rates rose making access to
credit unaffordable. The Economic Reform Program (ERP) was launched by the government to
re-establish macroeconomic stability and this was broadly achieved by 1995, when inflation had
been reduced to about 26%the exchange rate stabilized (as donor support resumed) and interest
rates fell. Yet the country was far from stable politically and key economic decisions – in
particular the privatization of the copper mines themselves and their consequent massive recapitalization using the resources that could be mobilized by the MNCs, were delayed
throughout the 1990s.68
This success was to come after the privatization of ZCCM in 2000, albeit on relatively
unfavorable terms, as by the end of 1999, ZCCM was hemorrhaging money as copper prices
had once again fallen and the privatization process itself was more like a fire sale. The MNCs
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which bought the mines in the first years of the 21st century was able to negotiate favorable
“development agreements” with the Government which included generous tax concessions and
– most importantly from the perspective of this paper – no liability for past environmental
degradation caused by the copper mines. The poor performance of the copper mining sector
since the mid-1970s, had gradually led to an increasingly inadequate management of the
negative environmental impacts arising from copper mining and ore smelting activities. Thus,
during the sale of the various mines operated by ZCCM to various MNCs, liability for the
adverse environmental legacies was an important matter throughout the negotiations, with the
private MNC investors unwilling to accept legal responsibility for historical environmental
liabilities, given both the degree and gravity of mining-related ecological and public health
obligations that had arisen over the previous three decades.
Further, as part of the ERP, the government introduced a “cash budget system” in 1993 as an
integral measure to reduce the high inflation rate. This restricted the government to available
funds, spending only from tax revenues already collected. While this measure was very effective
in reducing inflation, and restoring macro-economic stability, it also saw a large contraction in
public expenditure, even on areas like health (including environmental health programmes
important for mining communities) and education where demands were rising as a result of a
rapidly growing and youthful population and in the face of the HIV pandemic. In 1996, when the
HIV/AIDS pandemic was at its highest in Zambia, before the advent of ARV treatment, 16% of
the nation’s adult population was living with HIV, with higher occurrence in urban areas. The
Copper belt and Lusaka were reported to have the highest number of people living with the virus
and the average life expectancy rate dipped below 40 years.6970. Indeed, under the “cash budget”

69

Republic of Zambia (2002b) Zambia Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper. Lusaka, Zambia.

34

system, the MMD administration’s public spending cuts were considerable.71 This undermined
the administration’s ability to surmount its political reliance on urban communities and the
miners. Instead of reducing the fiscal costs associated with a bloated civil service, the MMD
administration opted to rid itself of publicly owned ventures (thereby creating large numbers of
retrenchees) and cutting social expenditure. This restrictive fiscal stance was sustained
throughout the 1990s and slowing wore away the political support for the MMD Government.
3.4.2 Debt Relief through the Highly-Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative
Apart from the privatization of the mines in 2000, one initiative that has proved vital for the
development of Zambia’s economy and public finances has been the forgiveness of the clear
majority of its foreign debt but this did not take effect until 2005 because of 15 years of
“structural adjustment”.72 In 1991, Zambia was heavily in debt to foreign creditors, mainly the
two Bretton Woods Institutions and foreign governments, amounting to more than US 7 billion
dollars. While US 0.8 billion dollars was forgiven by way of debt cancellation in 1993, this the
rate of debt forgiveness slowed during the 1990s as foreign creditors (chiefly the IMF, WB and
bi-lateral donor nations) attached policy conditionality’s linked to the full implementation of the
ERP before providing more debt relief. Thus, during the period of 1991 to 2005 Zambia
continued to be one of the most deeply indebted nations in the world.73
The consequent foreign debt overhang and interest payments not only absorbed foreign exchange
but restricted social spending throughout the period of economic recovery. However, during the
early years of the new century, under the leadership of late president Levy Mwanawasa (200270
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2008), Zambia become eligible for debt relief under the Highly-Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC)
Initiative, enabling the write-off of two-thirds of the debt, provided certain further economic
adjustment and fiscal conditions were met. This lead to a Government preparing a Poverty
Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) that began to more effectively address social issues,
particularly the rapidly rising problem of HIV/AIDS with the advent of ARV treatment for
people living with the virus. Zambia qualified for HIPC debt relief in 2005 and the foreign debt
burden was dramatically reduced – both through the HIPC Initiative itself and via other parallel
debt forgiveness programmes by other bilateral creditors.
This has allowed for fiscal expansion since 2005, but, following the 2008 global financial crisis,
copper prices fell again and after reviving around 2010/11 fell further from 2012. As in the
1970s, the Government has tried to sustain higher levels of public spending through external
borrowing – but this time on the Sovereign Bond market and has issued US$ 3 billion of
Eurobond debt in the last 5 years. In addition, indebtedness to China has spiraled over the last ten
years as China has financed large infrastructure projects - especially roads, stadia and airports which has added to the foreign debt stock. Subsidies have also reappeared, especially for fuel
and energy, and the fiscal deficit rose to over 10 percent of GDP in 2015. This has led the current
Minister of Finance, Hon. Felix Mutati M.P. to announce in Parliament that Government will
need to return to the IMF in 2017 to negotiate a new economic recovery programme.
Zambia stands as one of the most liberalized economies in southern Africa today. This has
mainly been due to the removal of product, foreign exchange and labor market controls and the
other elements of the “Washington Consensus” policy mix that has been implemented over the
last quarter of a century. The impact of this liberalization of the economy differed significantly
from the import-substitution economic policies of the Kaunda era, and created favorable market

36

conditions that was attractive to investment in an open economy where cross-border trade was
encouraged.74 The economic liberalization policy has encouraged massive foreign direct
investment – especially in the mines since their privatization in 2000 – but spelt the death knell
for many former nationalized enterprises that did not have managers with the entrepreneurial
skills needed to take advantage of this new environment.
3.4.4 Sale of State Owned Enterprises and Parastals
With the elimination of protection from foreign competition – the policy that was central to the
import substitution economic strategy - virtually all parastatals went out of business unless, like
the Dairiboard which was taken over by the Italian MNC Parmalat, they were taken over by
generally foreign investors. By 1997, 80% of the state-owned enterprises had either been sold off
or dissolved.75 The closure of many parastatals in the 1990s, and the consequent loss of many
formal sector jobs, together with the evident weakness of ZCCM, weakened the power of the
mining trade unions. Thus, the privatization of the mines in 2000 found a much more docile
labour movement than the one that played a key role in the downfall of the Kaunda regime and
workers, including miners, were prepared to accept much lower real wages and poorer working
and living conditions. Indeed, ZCCM had provided education and health facilities in its many
mine schools and hospitals as well as operating excellent sports and recreation facilities for its
workers and their families. However, virtually all these services and facilities were either handed
over the Government or the local councils after privatization or just allowed to become
dilapidated.
3.5 Transformed Development: 2000-2015
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Since the start of 21st century, following a dramatic recovery in copper prices in the first decade
of the century and massive recapitalization of the mines by their new MNC owners, the Zambian
economy has performed much better than in any previous period since the first years after
independence (when copper prices were also high). Further, following the HIPC debt relief and
the creation of more fiscal space in the national Budget, there has been more resources both from
the private and public sectors to support the diversification of the economy – especially in the
agriculture, tourism and agro-processing sectors. Between 2001 and 2012, the nation achieved
average annual GDP growth rates of over twice the population growth rate raising average per
capita income for the first time since the early years after independence. However, while the
economy has grown, the distribution of the benefits has been far from equitable and Zambia is
one of the most unequal countries in the world in terms of income and ownership of wealth. This
can at least in part be explained by the lack of investment in education and skills development in
recent decades, as well as continued weakness of the trade union movement. Thus, those school
leavers who do manage to get work often do so in poorly paid jobs, often casual employment
terms.
Further, though the economy has been generally performing well, politically Zambia society has
become more fragmented and disunited - especially on tribal lines - as evidenced by an increase
in political violence and electoral fraud since the 2001 general elections. This resulting increase
in political instability has threatened the growth of the economy and Zambia’s political
leadership has also changed several times over the past decade and a half which has caused
further political uncertainty.76
After failing to change the Constitution to allow him to stand a third time, Frederick Chiluba
hand-picked Levy Mwanawasa to run on the MMD ticket in the 2001 elections. Mwanawasa
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won the vote against Anderson Mazoka, a former Chief Executive Officer of the AngloAmerican Corporation and a Tonga by tribe who received widespread support from his home
area. There were claims from the opposition that the voting was rigged. Indeed, soon after the
election Mazoka took ill and died – with claims that he had been poisoned by the ruling MMD.
Mwanawasa was re-elected for a second term in 2006, winning against Hichilema Hakainde who
took over the leadership of the opposition (Tonga-based) party from Mazoka.
Despite having won the general election for a second term, Mwanawasa died in France before
the end of his presidency in August 2008. Following Mr. Mwanawasa's death, his vice president
Rupiah Banda succeeded him to the office of president, but he later went on to lose the 2011
general election by a small margin against another opposition leader, Michael Sata, who had
established a splinter party – the Patriotic Front (PF) – from the MMD when Chiluba had chosen
Mwanawasa as his successor in 2001. Hakainde also polled well (but lost) in the 2011 election
again getting support from his home area in Southern Province but also building support in
Western and North Western provinces.
However, like his predecessor Levy Mwanawasa, Sata also died during a trip abroad in 2014
whist visiting Israel, and he was succeeded by Edgar Lungu, also from the PF, who become the
6th president of the republic of Zambia, a position he holds today after winning the highly
contentious August 2016 general elections where Hakainde lost again but by about 100,000 votes
out of over 3 million cast. Once again, the voting patterns in the 2016 elections increasingly
reflected ethnic politics, despite Zambia being a multiethnic country. Ethnicity has historically
been utilized as a key determining factor when deciding when it comes to political leadership
and winning general elections in Zambia. Tribal ethnicity has been used either to discredit
political competitors from their own ethnic group or to reinforce support from the politician’s
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ethnic group. As such, during the last presidential election in Zambia, politicians from the ruling
party once again relayed upon using ‘tribalism’ as a weapon to disrepute their opponents, admits
other external factors affecting party choice, i.e. (media projections, popularity and economic
and political benefits).
CHAPTER 4: Environmental Assessment of Copper Mining
4.1 Copper Mining and Processing
Copper production is not an ecologically friendly activity. The process of removing copper from
copper ore varies depending on the type of copper ore and concentration of copper in the ore.
From mining and crushing through hydro- and pyrometallurgical processing to filtration, each
process of copper production can have substantial adverse effects on air quality, surface and
groundwater quality, and the land due to foreign materials introduced or toxic chemical residues
left behind (see Figure 5).77 Some of these ore purification processes are conducted at the mine
site itself, while in other instances, they are done at a distance.78 Copper production, like many
other industries in Zambia, is subject to extensive environmental regulation by government
ministries and other stakeholders, especially as it relates to air and water quality, materials
handling and waste disposal practices, due to the impact it has on both humans and the
environment.

4.1.1 Ore Extraction
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Copper ore (the bulk of which is sulfide minerals containing only 0.5 to 2.0 percent copper) can
be extracted from the earth in several ways. Ore occurring at some depth is obtained by
underground mining involving the sinking of vertical shafts into the earth to an appropriate depth
to reach the copper ore layers, and then driving horizontal tunnels into the ore strata.
Ores nearer the surface can be much more cheaply accessed through open cast mining by
quarrying or digging out the ore after removing the shallow surface layers (called the overlay).
As this is a much cheaper extraction method, globally, the bulk of copper extraction is through
open cast mining.79
Once the ore is removed from the earth, it is necessary to process it to obtain 99.99% pure
copper. This requires treating the copper ore through a series of processes to separate the copper
content (often less than 0.6%) from the surrounding rock, called “gangue” (and small proportions
of other minerals such as gold, silver, iron, nickel and uranium).80
4.1.2 Ore Concentration–Separating Minerals from the Gangue
The first processes are physical and involve the crushing and grinding of the ore and then
concentrating it through a process called “froth flotation.” Once crushed, the powdered ore is
mixed with a paraffin-like oil that makes the copper mineral particles water repellant. It is then
fed into a bath of water containing a foaming agent. Jets of air are forced through the tub, and the
water repellant copper mineral particles are picked up by the bubbles in the foam and rise to the
surface forming "froth." The unwanted waste rock (the gangue) falls to the bottom of the bath.
The foam is skimmed off the tub surface, and the "enriched ore" (now containing about 25%
copper) is taken for “roasting.”
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4.1.3 Smelting to form “Matte” and “Blister” Copper
The next processes are chemical and involve the smelting or heating to high temperature of the
enriched ore with fluxes such as silica and limestone. The ore melts and reacts with the fluxes,
while most of the impurities form a slag that rises to the top of the smelter and can be easily
removed. The molten ore is drained off from the bottom of the foundry and is a mixture of
copper sulfides and iron sulfides called “matte.”
The liquid matte is then oxidized by passing air through it to form “blister copper” (which is
99% pure copper) and sulfur dioxide. The term “blister” derives from the fact that the process
produces bubbles of sulfur dioxide on the surface of the copper. The blister copper is then cast
into anodes ready for the final stage of the process—electronic refining through the process of
electrolysis.
4.1.4 Electronic Refining to Form Pure Copper
In electric refining, the blister copper anodes are immersed in an electrolyte solution (a solution
that conducts electricity) containing copper sulfate and sulfuric acid. Pure copper cathodes are
arranged between the blister copper anodes, and a current of over 200A is passed through the
solution. Under these conditions, copper atoms dissolve from the (relatively) impure anode to
form copper ions (by giving up two electrons). These ions migrate through the electrolyte
solution and recombine with electrons on the cathode to form a new layer of pure copper atoms
on the cathode. Gradually the anode is eroded, and the cathode grows. After that, the cathodes
are removed, and the pure copper (99.99%) is scrapped off. Impurities in the blister copper
anodes either dissolve in the electrolyte solution (such as iron and nickel) or fall to the bottom as
sludge from which valuable minerals such as gold, silver, and platinum are removed.
4.1.5 Leaching
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Apart from underground and open cast mining, some mines extract copper ore from the earth by
passing dilute sulfuric acid through the layers of gangue containing the copper ore. The slowly
percolating acid dissolves the copper to form copper sulfate, and the copper is then recovered by
electronic refining described above. This method of ore extraction uses much less energy than
traditional mining (e.g. no energy required to super heat the smelters), and no waste gasses like
sulfur dioxide are given off. However, there is the apparent danger of contaminating ground and
surface water systems.
4.1.6 Recovery of Copper from Old Tailings of Gangue
Where historic waste in the form of “tailings” from past mining activity is now found to have
“economic” quantities of copper content using 21st-century technology, some copper is extracted
from these historic tailings for further processing. This is occurring at the “Black Mountain”
tailing site in Kitwe in the Copper Belt Province.
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Figure 6. Ecological Effects of Copper Production81
Copper production is not an ecologically benevolent action. From mining and crushing through
hydro- and pyrometallurgical dispensation to purifying, copper production can have important
hostile influences on air quality, surface and ground water quality, and the land (see figure 7
above). While these influences can be severe when the ingredients handled include poisonous or
hazardous substances (e.g., Copper ores with a comparatively high concentration of arsenic).
Thus, uncontrolled copper smelting processes affect the quality of air through the emitting large
quantities of particulate matter, trace elements, and sulfur oxides, which can have adverse effects
on human health. Equally, land is changed significantly because of open‐ cut mining with large
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pits being created from mining processes resulting in waste rock being generated from. Adverse
water quality impacts are caused primarily by land disposal practices that fail to contain wastes,
by run-on and run-off controls that are inadequate to prevent surface water from flowing through
impoundments, or by groundwater infiltrating surface impoundments.82 In Kitwe, Mufulira,
Chingola and Ndola, where some casting takes place, yellow fumes produced by sulphur oxide
can be seen in the air and respiratory difficulties are not unusual. In Kabwe town, the town has
experienced has a long-standing issue of lead poisoning and, notwithstanding the scaling down
of lead and zinc mining in the area.83
4.2 Regulatory Environmental Laws and Copper Mining in Zambia
This section will examine whether Zambia has built the necessary legislative framework and
administrative capacity to effectively regulate, protect and implement environmental
conservation measures, especially in areas affected by large-scale copper mining operations. It
will also examine the roles different stakeholders play within the copper mining industry and the
significance of stimulating environmental protection awareness among all stakeholders. This is
important especially now, when most countries are attempting to attain sustainable development.
This commitment includes working to achieve four of the United Nations' Seventeen Sustainable
Development Goals of (I) good health and wellbeing, (ii) clean water and sanitation, (iii)
sustainable cities and communities and (iv) responsible consumption and production, all require
sound environmental protection and management practices for their attainment.
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Section 4.2 1 Ministries and Departments Pertinent to Environmental Protection in Zambia
In this investigation of global copper production and how copper mining results in environmental
degradation in Zambia, we explore “environmental governance,” a term that denotes the set of
regulatory procedures and organizations by which political players affect environmental
activities and outcomes. Pertinent to this discussion are key elements such as the “politicaleconomic relationships”84 that governments personify, and the “characteristics, activities, and
outcomes”85 that form the nature and efficacy of environmental regulation.86

Figure 7. Organogram of Environmental Management Institutions in Zambia 87
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There are several governmental organizations and agencies tasked with addressing
environmental management issues across different sections of society in Zambia, most notably
the Ministry of Lands, Natural Resources and Environmental Protection,88 previously known as
Ministry of Tourism, Environment and Natural Resources (MTENR). This ministry is the focal
point where all matters of environmental conservation and management in Zambia are addressed.
The effectiveness of the Ministry depends on capacity and performance of several departments
and agencies housed under this ministerial body that aim to address the significant problems in
the current environmental governance of Zambia.
The Department of Environment and Natural Resources Management89 is the arm of the ministry
responsible for formulating and implementing policy designed to attain sound ecological and
natural resources management. It researches and coordinates different methods of responding to
any adverse environmental impact that may occur in the country, such as the pollution of rivers.
This was the case in 2005 when the Kafue River was contaminated with sulfuric acid and other
toxic chemicals by Konkola Copper Mines.90 The department has also been authorized to
manage, coordinate, monitor and assess the actions of other policymaking agencies for their
environmental impacts on behalf of the government.
The Zambia Environmental Management Agency91 (ZEMA) investigates the potential negative
impacts of any developments—including copper mining developments—through conducting
environmental impact assessment (EIA) protocols and the development and application of
environmental governance guidelines across a broad variety of sectors. It has been responsible
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since its inception in 1992 (when it was called the Environmental Council of Zambia) for
undertaking EIAs and issuing environmental licenses to authorize the operation of development
activities in a sustainable manner and to ensure that these developments remain environmentally
sustainable.92
The Ministry of Mines, Energy and Water Development93 is responsible for a broad range of
issues including environmental conservation measures related to the mining sector and the
protection of the nation’s ground and surface water resources. It is also responsible for the
development, supervision, and enhancement of environmental standards and enforcing job safety
measures in the mines. This ministry was the result of a merger between two departments to
oversee two major environmentally-related areas: mineral resource management and water
affairs. The Department of Mines Safety attempts to ensure that mine safety regulations are
observed in the mines to protect the health and safety of the mines’ workforce per the mine
health and safety laws and regulations that it promulgates.94 The Department of Water Affairs is
tasked with conserving the nation’s surface and groundwater resources and, in partnership with
local municipalities, to supply potable water to homes and businesses. Surveillance of the water
quality in Zambia’s main surface water bodies (lakes, rivers and streams) as well as in the
nation’s extensive ground water aquifers together with building awareness related to the
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sustainable use of Zambia’s water resources are but two of the objectives of the department,
especially as related to industrial mining activities in the country.95
4.2.2 Environmental Legislation and National Guidelines in Zambia
The Zambian laws and guidelines regarding environmental conservation are comparatively up to
date, and their development span a period of three decades across various ministries. In 2009, a
major review of the actual implementation of Zambia's environmental conservation policies led
the government to launch a new National Policy on the Environment (NPE), intended to
condense all the existing laws and regulations in the country into a harmonized set of policies.
However, like most cases in Zambia, the main problems lie not in the policy or legal framework
but rather in their implementation. Due primarily to budget constraints, the government has
failed to effectively implement the NPE, and the sustainable management of the environment and
exploitation of its natural resources remains elusive.
Currently, the principal and fundamental piece of legislation that guides and regulates
environmental management and administration in the nation is the Environmental Management
Act (No 12 of 2011).96 The Act contains modern features and institutional arrangements related
to the conservation of natural resources and environmental protection. It was through this act that
the nation’s principal governing body for environmental management, formerly known as the
Environmental Council of Zambia, became referred to as the Zambia Environmental
Management Agency (ZEMA). Salient features of the act include:
I.Prevention of contamination and ecological degradation, including that from historical
mining operations.
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II.Provision of cooperative ecological governance grounded in the values of the shared
heritage of both present and future generations.
III.Development of environmentally sound strategies, policies, and programs aimed at
allowing sustainable use of natural resources for economic and social development while
enforcing environmental management regulations.
The environmental laws in Zambia have been more efficiently implemented under the new
Act than they were under its predecessor, the 1990 Environmental Protection and Pollution
Control Act and its 1999 Amendment (No 12 of 1990 and No 12 of 1999). However, parts of
the old guidelines and regulations are still being adhered to under the new law, because the
new Act covers only specific damage to the environment that is produced by contamination
or land use. The other issues are addressed in separate laws and regulations, and a high level
of cooperation is required between other government departments, agencies and local
municipalities for their execution if sound ecological measures are to be implemented in
Zambia. These regulations include:
I.

Waste Management (SI 71 of 1993)

II.

Water Pollution Control (SI 72 of 1993)

III.

Pesticides and Toxic Substances (1994)

IV.

Air Pollution Control (SI 142 of 1996)

V.
VI.

Environmental Impact Assessments (SI 28 of 1997)
Hazardous Waste Management (SI of 2001)

Some of the salient features of the 2011 Environmental Management Act, in its attempt to
support and strengthen the efficacy of future environmental conservation efforts, relate to
ensuring that the policies and measures that are adopted continue to work in the face of varying

50

socio-economic situations.97
4.3 Stakeholders’ Effects on Environmental Conservation
The copper mining industry has many stakeholders; for this research paper, key stakeholders
have been identified that represent a wide range of interests. Their role is to guarantee that their
respective agendas are recognized and their benefits and wishes promoted. Apart from the
Government (including municipal councils) and the private mine owners themselves, these
stakeholders include the church, NGOs and civil society, the Mine Workers Union of Zambia
(MUZ), the judiciary and the media. Each of these stakeholders plays an instrumental role in
influencing the operations of the copper mining industry, the distribution of its benefits and the
mitigation of the negative environmental impacts of copper extraction and ore processing
activities set out in section 4.1 of this paper. Some of these stakeholders, like the church, civil
society and NGOs act as defenders of the environment and the communities affected by adverse
impacts on it. They do so by relentlessly holding government to account to perform its statutory
duties to its citizens under such laws as the 2012 Environmental Management Act and
pressurizing the mining companies to execute their commercial operations to minimize and
mitigate any adverse environmental externalities arising from their activities in the wider interest
of all.
An example of this occurred in 2011 when the Supreme Court of Zambia upheld a High Court
verdict which found Konkola Copper Mines (KCM) guilty of water pollution in 2006 which
poisoned thousands of Cingula residents. The judgment was delivered in favour of victims who
had died after having ingested contaminated water from the Kafue River, which had been
poisoned by mining waste discharged into it by KCM. It took five long years of the villages
97
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working hand in hand with the NGO that sued the mining company before KCM was fined two
million dollars in damages. The High Court made the judgment and set the damages due to
KCM’s “gross recklessness.”98
The role of civil society and NGOs this case was fundamental, as they further lobbied the
government and the mining industry to strengthen their arrangements to protect the environment
and the mining communities affected by copper production. The result was the strengthening of
the policy and legal framework as already referred to in section 4.2 above.
Other vital stakeholders in environmental conservation include the media, which serves to
inform the public on all subjects pertinent to their health, well-being, financial status and
ecological position, by acting as watchdogs of the actions of the mines.99 On the other hand, the
media, either state-owned or independent, can be aligned with the government and/or the
interests of the mining MNCs and broadcast or publish what is pleasant from the MNCs’ or
Government’s viewpoint (e.g. publicizing “Corporate Social Responsibility” spending by the
mines while downplaying any news of violations of statutory limits to air or water quality). This
underlines the need for reputable sources of independent media which also have the capacity for
good investigative journalism for the public to be properly informed about the true costs and
benefits of copper mining. Unfortunately, with an increasingly factionalized and tribal political
environment, most “independent” media are “aligned” to the Government or the opposition and
their credibility is undermined. Further, the capacity for well researched investigative journalism
is also limited.
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The church’s role in advocating for social justice is realized in the context of this paper by it
playing a reconciliation role, facilitating dialogue between the parties and communities affected
by contaminants arising from the mines and the mines when they are accused of causing this
injustice. Its key role is to act as a mediator.
Finally, the Mine Workers Union of Zambia’s role is to promote the interests of their members
who are employees of the mines by championing the cause of fair salaries for their members and
to secure better and safer working conditions in line with the state regulations on working
environment conditions. As already observed in Chapter three however, their power has become
greatly restricted from its zenith in 1991 as the hardships of structural adjustment and
privatization has cowed their members’ appetite for any militant action. Thus, in practice, the
extent to which they can affect the behavior and decisions of the mine owners is limited and
regularly the interests of the mines take precedence over those of their workers.
4.4 Zambian Copper Mine and Smelter Pollutants
While air pollutants do arise from ore extraction activities – especially open cast mining – and
ground and surface water contamination occurs wherever leaching takes place or where water is
pumped from deep underground mines, the primary source of pollution in Zambia’s mining
sector is smelters. Post 2001, most of the formerly nationalized and unprofitable copper mines
under the Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines Limited (ZCCM) have been sold off, and the new
investors have revitalized the mines through huge injections of capital and the scaling up of
production to make returns on their investments. However, given the arguments set out in
Chapter One of this paper relating to how intrinsically the mining MNCs are tied into the global
capitalist system where the governing logic is the maximization of returns to shareholders and
senior managers and the minimization of costs, protection of the environment is most likely to be
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undervalued, especially if mitigation measures are costly and local regulatory watchdogs can be
bribed or otherwise “internalized” into seeing things from the mine owners standpoint.
Regardless, several serious ecological consequences are clearly linked to operating a copper
mines and smelters and the significant ones are considered here.
4.4.1 Air Pollution Impacts: Sulfur dioxide (SO2)
The chief cause of sulfur dioxide contamination is from the roasting and purifying of copperbearing sulfide minerals in the Copper belt. The principal ore is chalcopyrite (CuFeS2), and the
first phase in most procedures is roasting or smelting the ore in the open air, which oxidizes
roughly all the copper and generates sulfur dioxide.100 The actions at Nkana smelter generate
sulfur dioxide and dust. Mufulira copper smelter is another principal source of sulfur dioxide air
pollution. Both Nkana and Mufulira smelters adversely affect the surrounding communities with
poor air quality. Calculations from those areas have revealed a sulfur dioxide concentration of
500-1000 μg/m3, significantly surpassing the nation’s regulation limit of 50μg/m3.101 The
population of nearby residential towns in the Kitwe area are daily exposed to high SO2
concentrations, as they are near the smelters. Children, women and the elderly are particularly
badly affected. The poor quality of the air increases the incidence of respiratory disease-related
health problems such as asthma and lung infections among the general inhabitants in those areas,
especially those with extremely high exposure to SO2 because they live close to, and downwind
of, the largest source of the SO2 emissions - the smelters.
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4.4.2 Water Pollution Impacts
Water contamination in Zambia is mostly created by liquid waste from mining actions that is
released into water bodies, and nutrient-rich runoff from farming lands in the Kafue and
Mazabuka areas.102 In the Copper Belt Province, many groups do not have access to steady
piped, purified water from the local municipalities; rather, they rely on boreholes which pump up
ground water or on streams, rivers and water bodies for their households and livelihoods water
requirements. Copper production growth poses a hazard, as water pollution arises from leaching,
mining dump runoff, leakage from tailings dams and unintended releases of raw wastewater
containing acidic liquids from small particles of good rock (silt or sediment). The valley tailings
dams have been shaped into huge ponds containing acidic levels of sediment and it is this residue
that has created environmental problems over time that affect local communities.
The noteworthy contributors to metal contamination are Nchanga, Nkana, and Konkola mining
operations.103 In Kitwe town, the Konkola Copper Mine (KCM)’s Nchanga smelter has been the
primary source of pollution of the Kafue River, with reported cases of a few of KCM’s pipelines
having discharged significant amounts of acidic fluids into numerous tributaries (Chingola and
Mushishima streams) of the Kafue, one of Zambia’s major rivers.104 The Environmental Council
of Zambia (ECZ)’s certified statement in 2006 highlighted incidents of water pollution, finding
KCM liable for having negligently polluted the Kafue River, with reports at the time having
shown liquid contained 1,000% more copper, 77,000% more manganese and 10,000% more

102

"Environmental Council of Zambia." Accessed December 24, 2016. http://apps.unep.org/publications/pmtdocuments/National%20Solid%20Waste%20Management%20Strategy%20for%20Zambia2004National%20Solid%20Waste%20Management%20Strategy(1).pdf.
103 Ibid. SGAB and others, 2005.
104 Environmental Council of Zambia, ECZ (2006) Report on Investigation of the Pollution of the River Kafue, Mushishima and
Chingola Streams by the Tailings Leach Plant of Konkola Copper Mines at the Nchanga Integrated Business Unit.

55

cobalt than recommended levels, creating grave consequences on the environment and human
life, with many victims having reported suffering severe digestive and organ problems.105
Such unacceptable releases of polluted waste water are not the only difficulty created by copper
mining production. The Ministry of Agriculture and Co-operatives has further stated that
populations living near the Kafue River have been economically affected by the pollution of the
Kafue. Officials from the ministry have claimed that “agricultural farmers, i.e. Hippo village
communities, suffered economic effects from the contamination of the Mushishima stream,
being the only source water, thus affecting over 100 households in the village, which are all
small scale farmers”.106 Those living near KCM’s Nchanga plant have been the victims of a
similar fate, because residues and sludge from the tailing dams have overflowed onto cultivated
areas, contaminating the soil , thus rendering the land infertile, preventing agriculturalists from
cultivating food products. Losses incurred by farmers was estimated to total K100,300,000
(£12,641) in lost income during 2005 alone.107
4.4.3 Land and Soil Pollution Impacts
Copper mining, both small and large scale, can create tremendous ecological devastation and
squalor, rendering land unfit for either human or animal life through the degradation of the
topsoil.108 In the copper mining areas of the Copper Belt Province, the buildup of metals in the
topsoil has been a direct outcome of wind-borne dust elements blown from the mines,
supplemented by other fallout contaminants from the copper smelters. It must be noted that the
soil in the natural environment of the mining areas has been tested and naturally contains some
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traces of metal elements within subsoil structures (e.g. in many areas chromium and nickel are
found in greater concentrations than the average found underneath the surface soil layer 70-90
cm).109
However, in mining areas, extremely high metal element concentrations have been found, far
above any naturally occurring levels, gravely threatening the environment and local communities
around them. This was established in a full scholarship on soil pollution conducted on the
Copper Belt.110 The scholarship comprised of thorough field investigations in five Copper belt
mining towns that included Mufulira and Chingola, and to a smaller degree with Kalulushi,
Chililabombwe, and Chambishi.111 The samples collected revealed that many contained
extremely high concentrations of metal elements which were clearly linked with mining area
contaminants, in contrast with the concentrations of these metal elements occurring naturally in
non-mining areas (see Figure 8).112
It is hard to ascertain how the study’s original estimates were made of the economic and
financial impact of the use of these contaminated soils for agricultural livelihoods of the local
population. However, in the case of these Copper belt towns, subsurface samples demonstrate
that the surface soil layer contained at least “ten times more and at other instances, records
indicated an astonishing fifty times more soil pollution in more or less the entire Copper belt.113
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Figure 8. High Soil Absorption of Pollution on the Copper belt

CHAPTER 5: ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS
5.0 Introduction
This final chapter examines and discusses the results of the study on the effects of copper
production on the environment and local communities in Zambia, and how the environment has
changed because of mining and smelting operations. Using a political ecological framework with
that of a multiple scale analysis, the discussion is based on the local impact on the Copper Belt
Province.
5.1 The Impact of Large Scale Copper Production on the Environment
Zambia is home to one of the world’s largest sources of copper ore, geographically located on
the border between Zambia and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), in a region known as
the Copper Belt Province. Since independence, the mining industry has been the economic
backbone of Zambia’s development, with the mining sector contributing significantly to the
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nation’s overall growth. From the country’s mining sector, the Zambian Government gathers
revenue in the form of mineral royalties, payments, payroll and corporate taxes and other
peripheral benefits that are used for developmental schemes and public service provision in the
health, education, agriculture, infrastructural development, manufacturing and construction
sectors. Furthermore, the industry is one of the principal employers in the country, directly and
indirectly providing employment opportunities to thousands of people across the nation, given
the huge foreign investments that have invigorated Zambia’s mining sector since the beginning
of this century. In 2015 alone, Zambia produced 710,860 metric tons of copper, generating
foreign revenue worth over US$6.9 billion.114 Heavy investments in the sector by foreign mining
companies have been made following the privatization of the copper mines from the year 2000,
after three decades of nationalization and lack of re-investment. Since then, encouraged by a
revival in copper prices, mining MNCs have invested over US$10 billion in the sector,
revitalizing Zambia’s copper production to historically high levels. Copper production increased
from about 250,000 tons in 2000 to over 750,000 tons in 2013.115
However, taking a wider view of these developments, while they suggest great news for Zambia
from its mining sector, the reality is that most Zambians continue to incur negative social, health
and environmental impacts from its operations. The “resource curse” of copper production is
evident, especially by citizens who live in the Copper Belt Province. The acceptance over the last
quarter of a century of neoliberal economic policies, centered on private sector-led growth and
an open economy that is welcoming to foreign direct investment, called for a complete
reorientation of the laws and policies of the nation. These, inter alia, conferred generous tax
breaks and incentive packages for the mining companies which were detrimental to the nation’s
114
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public finances and hence public service delivery and development outcomes. For instance, in
the period of 2000–07, on average, the mining industry paid less than 0.1% of GDP to the
government by way of taxes and royalties, although accounting for about 6.2% of GDP. This
truncated contribution was due to the generous mining tax regime as well as transfer pricing and
other profit shifting arrangements engaged in by the MNCs to reduce their exposure to Zambian
tax obligations.
All of Zambia’s copper mines are now owned by multinational mining companies who are
intricately enmeshed in the global capitalist system and whose overall objective is to maximize
profits and financial returns for their shareholders. From a political ecology viewpoint, the
conduct of mining activities on the Copper belt is inescapably driven by the precepts of a
neoliberal economic paradigm and the dictates of the international financial/capitalist system.
In line with the above viewpoint, the ability to wield political influence plays a crucial role in
what measures are taken to promote environmental conservation and the efficacy of these
measures.116 Politics includes the ability to secure and use power to attain one’s advantage and
objectives in struggle with others having alternative goals and values. Authority in a political
ecology context can be understood as “the skill of a performer to regulate their own contact with
the environment and the interface of other performers with the environment”117
A prominent result from the multiple scale analysis is how the national government has radically
impacted land use by altering who has access to what land in Zambia, through the enactment of
various legislation and policies. The nature of land tenure arrangements as understood in the
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minerals and mining legislation of Zambia gives the State the right to lands with minerals.118 Per
Turner,119 “Two related classes of value can be made from land and land capitals. First, the value
characterized by the floods of advantages that they make for those holding rights to them, and
the price that market forces assign to them.”
The government possesses the authority to regulate and make choices on land use and land
ownership in discussion with other performers (i.e. mining companies, local communities,
traditional rulers and officeholders) with respect to mining rights. The exercise of power by
actors is highly likely to create change in the decisions and policies that Government makes.120
Thus, the enormous power which the mining MNCs have arising from their ability to mobilize
large capital resources and create employment for thousands of Zambians confers on them the
ability to interact with Government in ways that favours their interests even at the expense of
wider development objectives. Such unequal power between parties is used to create and sustain
unfair relations between them, resulting in struggle and conflict owing to dissatisfaction over the
sharing of the proceeds of the nation’s mineral wealth and the lack of effective environmental
management when it conflicts with the commercial interests of the MNCs and their ability to
dominate in the debate over the control of resources.121 In Zambia, particularly with mining
developments on the Copper belt, mining operations by the MNCs act as an instrument for the
government to exploit for its own political plans, as they assert the right to bestow mining
franchises to particular mining companies in return for relatively paltry taxes and royalties.
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Applying the multiple scale analysis to mining on the Copper belt (see Figure 10), it was
observed that stronger actors in the copper mining sector, such as government leaders, mining
companies, the IMF and World Bank, are wielding their disproportionate power to achieve their
own agendas at the expense of the environment and weaker performers—especially local
communities in the mining towns and the surrounding areas. Each interest group uses its power
derived from the financial resources, tools and skills it can muster, to maneuver and advance
their own agenda. For instance, mining companies use their ability to mobilize enormous capital
amounts to obtain access to the nation’s copper ores while Government supplies them with
generous inducement packages to do so.
Developing countries like Zambia, who want to sustain economic growth and provide
employment for their people, are led to believe that they must offer attractive incentives in what
has been termed a “race to the bottom.” These incentives often include turning a blind eye to
negative environmental impacts or agreeing to reduce their liability for doing so, as these
countries must also operate and survive in a global economy driven by private profits and highly
mobile capital flows.
Further, the exploitation of a country’s natural resources by foreign MNCs is inevitably a key
source of environmental and societal struggle. This is particularly the case where local people are
discontented over the arrangements put in place to determine how the income and wealth
produced by the exploitation of their natural resources is distributed but are the ones who face
the brunt of all the negative environmental impacts. They are left them with little material benefit
but bear the greatest environmental costs.122
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5.2. Mining Pollution Impacts at the Local Level
The findings of this research corroborate the argument that mining operations on the Copper belt
province in Zambia have resulted in an increase in the number and scale of environmental and
human quality of life problems.123 In the present study, specific negative impacts of mining
processes upon the environment were recognized in the investigation that included; substantial
and health threatening land, water and air contamination.
On the matter of land deprivation, vast areas of land have been cleared to accommodate open
cast/surface mining and to store (especially in the form of tailing dumps and dams) the waste
material from ore extraction and processing activities. In the case of soil fertility and water
quality, lands intended for farming and pastoral activities have likewise been ruined through a
poisoning of soils and water sources because of the mining activities negatively affecting local
community livelihoods based on agriculture. Soil pollution remains a huge issue, given that land
is a stationary asset. Hence land pollution contaminants remain in the same area polluting the
surrounding ecosystems thus creating an imbalance, deforestation and the obliteration of wildlife
environments because of large scale copper mining. Copper mining on the Copper belt involves
mineral exploitation that comprises of underground pits and the demolition of rocks using
ammunition which could create extreme damage to the environment and release toxic dust into
the atmosphere. Further damage and removal of the vegetative cover has contributed to a large
areas of soil erosion and extreme run off water and flash flooding during the rainy season.124
Air pollution is another environmental problem prevalent in the Copper belt mining areas, arising
from the use of explosives in quarrying and drilling activities as well as the release of toxic gases
– principally sulfur dioxide – from the copper smelters. These actions have created highly
123
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contaminated atmospheric air in the areas surrounding mining activities, severely jeopardizing
human health and well-being. The use of explosives also creates dangers to structures and there
are reported cases of mining operations at Konkola Copper Mines in Kitwe using piercing and
blasting that had caused cracks and the failure of structures built in the surrounding
community.125
Contamination of surface and groundwater resources in the research area was a clear outcome of
the mining operations undertaken. The Mushishima, Muntimpa and Chingola streams and the
mighty Kafue river itself are all contaminated. These water courses are stained a cloudy brown
color as their waters mix with chemicals originating from effluent spilled by Konkola Copper
Mines (KCM) that contains suspended solids (containing poisonous substances such as mercury
and sulphur).126 The result of pollution of water sources has endangered human life and
wellbeing as well as that of pastoral animals and wildlife. The outcome of this water pollution
has affected both the economic livelihoods and the domestic households of people, especially
those residing in rural areas adjacent to, or downstream from, mining areas without access to
running treated pipe water, that are left to travel long distances in search of potable water for
themselves and their animals. 127

5.3 Conclusion and Recommendations
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There is a growing necessity for the Government of Zambia to harmonize mining and ecological
legislation and strategies to promote both economic growth and to safeguard social-ecological
development. However, to get to that point, the following recommendations are proposed.
The impacts of copper mining upon the environment in Zambia are very conspicuous. Although
there have been some achievements d thus far, a lot remains to be done to make more substantial
progress. Future development policies and plans ought to promote economic growth but also
strengthen the capacity to protect the environment by stakeholders - including the Government
administration - to enhance the efficacy of ecological conservation efforts, ensure strict
compliance with environmental standards and enforce criminal penalties against mining
proprietors who are found to be in breach of the law.
Secondly, there is a need to strengthen the management of ecological reporting systems, and to
devise effective environment impact assessment tools. The existing administration and
management procedures fall short, and there are numerous discrepancies in the environmental
management systems (EMS) under the supervision of ZEMA used for shadowing the sector. This
will allow regulators to consistently uphold national standards to curb pollution that terminates
livelihoods and destroys the environment in mining areas. Without effective monitoring systems,
violations will continue to be made with relative impunity by mining companies. Thus, ZEMA
should be able to effectively monitor not only the mining proprietors’ arrangements and
procedures for mitigating the negative environmental impacts of their activities but also ensure
that these procedures are indeed effective in reducing to a minimum the environmental footprint
of the operations. Furthermore, there is a need for better technical and geoscientific data, and
training for personnel on environmental management that is relevant and practical for everyday
work and application. Such practical trainings should focus on specific topics, i.e. waste
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management spill prevention and monitoring, reporting and evaluation, as well as emergency
evacuation procedures.
This investigation was based on one theoretical concept, that copper production combined with
the profit seeking / cost minimizing behavior of multinational mining companies who operate in
the global capitalist system - directly affect the specific forms of Zambian mining activities
which in turn has significant negative environmental and social impact, resulting in
environmental degradation at the local level. This theory has been tested in line with the findings
presented through economic and environmental indicators and applied in the current analysis.
The current legal requirements are not sufficient to ensure ethical mining practices when
discharging waste from extraction or smelting processes, resulting in the negative social and
environmental impacts associated with copper mining.
This leads to the conclusion that there is an urgent need to enhance and implement strategies,
systems and legislation which allows for greater transparency in the mining industry about the
procedures used to mitigate negative environmental impacts, the quantitative and qualitative
results of these procedures and the steps required to be taken as soon as compliance levels wane.
The full involvement of the government, local communities, non-governmental organizations,
the mining companies themselves, and other stakeholders engaged in the mining industry, is
needed to comprehensively address the social-environmental impacts of mining operations. This
should be done by designing and implementing holistic and practical environmental protection
legislation that is backed by institutions and resources that can effectively implement this
legislation to attain genuine mitigation of all undesirable environmental and ecological outcomes
of mining activity at the local (and wider) levels.

67

Bibliography

1. Abi, D. (2007), Undermining Development? Copper Mining in Zambia, A joint Report by
ACTS, Christian Aid and Scotland Agency
2. Action for Southern Africa (ACTSA) et al. (2007) “Undermining Development? Copper
Mining in Zambia.” American Geosciences Institute. Mineral Commodity Summaries,
2016. Accessed November 15, 2016. http://www.americangeosciences.org/criticalissues/research-database/docs/mineral-commodity-summaries-2016
3. Adams, W. M. & Hutton, J. (2007), “People, Parks and Poverty: Political Ecology and
Biodiversity Conservation,” Conservation and Society, 5, (2), 147-183
4. Analysis on Copper Mining Trends in Zambia-ZCCM Investments Holdings Plc. ZCCM
Investments Holdings Plc. 2016. Accessed December 06, 2016. http://www.zccmih.com.zm/analysis-copper-mining-trends-zambia/
5. Austin. “Land Allocation.” Land Allocation.
6. Bebbington, A., Hinojosa, L., Bebbington, H.D., Burneo, M.L. and Ximena, W. (2008)
“Contention and Ambiguity: Mining and the Possibilities of Development,” Development
and Change, Vol. 39, No. 6: 887-914. Blackwell Publishing
7. Bellow, U. K. “Fiscal Policy Implications of Structural Adjustment Programs,” University
of Lagos, Lagos, Nigeria, Oct. 26-28, 1987.
8. Bigsten, A. and Kayizzi-Mugerwa, S. 2000. The Political Economy of Policy Failure in
Zambia. Working Papers in Economics, Department of Economics, Göteborg University.

9. Blaikie, Piers. "Changing environments or changing views? A political ecology for
developing countries." Geography (1995): 203-214.
10. Blaikie, P. M. & Brookfield, H. C. (1987), Land Degradation and Society, Routledge
Kegan & Paul, London, 296pp

11. Brockington, D., Duffy, R., & Igoe, J. (2008). Nature Unbound: Conservation, Capitalism
and the Future of Protected Areas. UK: Earth scan.
12. Bryant, R. L. (1998), “Power, Knowledge and Political Ecology in the Third World: A
Review,” Progress in Physical Geography, 22, (1), 79-84
13. Bryant, R. L. and Bailey, S. (1997) Third World Political Ecology, Routledge Publications,
London. P 39

68

14. Central Statistical Office. Quoted in Milimo, J. T., Shilito, T., & Brock, K. (2000). “Who
will ever listen to the poor? The poor of Zambia speak.” Lusaka: Zambia Social Investment
Fund.
15. Chigozie, Emeka. “10 African Minerals of Highest Economic Value—Answers Africa."
Accessed October 23, 2016. http://answersafrica.com/african-minerals.html
16. Chamber of Mines of Zambia » Production Figures.Chamber of Mines of Zambia.
Accessed December 07, 2016. http://mines.org.zm/production-figures/.
17. Chanthunya, C.L. and Murinde, V. 1998. Trade Regime and Economic Growth. Alders hot
and Brookfield, Vermont.
18. Copper Price Rises." Zambia Daily Mail Copper Price Rises Comments. Accessed
December 08, 2016. https://www.daily-mail.co.zm/?p=72823
19. Coakley, George J. (2000) “The Mineral Industry of Zambia.” Minerals Yearbook. Volume
III. Area Reports: International.
20. Copestake, J. & Weston, P. (2000). “Pitfalls of Debt Reduction: A Counterfactual Case
Study of Zambia During the Early 1990s.” Journal of International Development, 12(4),
585-600.
21. Czech Geological Survey. (2007). Environmental-Geochemical Atlas of the CentralNorthern Part of the Copper Belt Province of Zambia. Project of the Development
Cooperation Programme of the Czech Republic.
22. Daniel, Philip. Africanization, Nationalization and Inequality: Mining Labor and the
Copper Belt in Zambian Development. Cambridge University Press, London, 1979
23. Dinh, H., Adugna, A., and Myers, B. 2002. The Impact of Cash Budgets on Poverty
Reduction in Zambia. Africa Region Working Paper Series No. 39, World Bank,
Washington, D.C.
24. DRC Now Africa's Biggest Copper Producer - African Business Magazine." African
Business Magazine. 2015. Accessed December 06, 2016.
http://africanbusinessmagazine.com/sectors/commodities/drc-now-africas-biggest-copperproducer/.
25. ECZ, 2001, State of the Environment in Zambia 2000, Page 94
26. Environmental Management Act (No 12 of 2011).
27. Environmental Protection and Pollution Control Act 1990

69

28. Fearnside, P. (1989), “The Charcoal of Carajás: A Threat to the Forests of Brazil’s Eastern
Amazon Region,” Ambio Vol 18 (2): p. 142
29. Ferguson, James. Expectations of modernity: myths and meanings of urban life on the
Zambian Copper belt. Vol. 57. Univ of California Press, 1999.
30. Ferraro, Vincent. “Dependency Theory: An Introduction.” The Development Economics
Reader 12, No. 2 (2008): 58-64
31. Fessehaie, Judith, and Mike Morris. “Value chain dynamics of Chinese copper mining in
Zambia: enclave or linkage development?” The European Journal of Development
Research 25, no. 4 (2013): 537-556.
32. Fraser, Alastair. Zambia, Mining, and Neoliberalism: Boom and Bust on the Globalized
Copper Belt. Palgrave Macmillan US, 2010
33. Garvin, T., Mcgee, T.K., Smoyer, Tomic, K. E. and Aubynn, E.A. (2009) “Communitycompany relations in gold mining in Ghana,” Journal of Environmental Management, Vol.
90: 571-586
34. Gwebu, Thando D. “Botswana’s Mining Path to Urbanization and Poverty Alleviation.”
Journal of Contemporary African Studies 30, no. 4 (2012): 611-630.
35. Hansen, Karen Tranberg. 2000. Salaula: The World of Secondhand Clothing and Zambia.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press. P.87
36. “How KCM Is Killing the Zambian Copperbelt. Part 2: Air ...” July 26, 2016. Accessed
October 24, 2016. http://www.foilvedanta.org/articles/how-kcm-is-killing-the-zambiancopperbelt-part-2-air-pollution/.
37. Holmes, T. 2004. “The History of Zambia.” The Zambian. Available at
www.thezambian.com.
38. Human Development Reports, “Zambia: The Human Development Index—Going Beyond
Income.” http://hdrstats.undp.org/countries/country_fact_sheets/cty_fs_ZMB .html.
39. Hyden, G. & Karlstrom, B. (1993), “Structural Adjustment as a Policy Process: The Case
of Tanzania,” World Development, 21, (9), 1395-1404.
40. Kaaba, T. & Darian, A. (2001). “Impact of Mining Sector Investment in Ghana: A study of
the Tarkwa Mining Region.” Website:
http://www.saprin.org/ghana/research/gha_mining.pdf.
41. Karmiloff, Igor. 1990. “Zambia” in Manufacturing Africa: Performance and Prospects of
Seven Countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, edited by Roger Riddell, 297-336. London: James
Currey. P. 298-299

70

42. Kelly, M. (1998), Mining and the Freshwater Environment. London: Elsevier Applied
Science/ British Petroleum. P 86
43. Keynes, John M. “A Treatise on Money: The Applied Theory of Money.” No.
330.156/K44t v. 2. 1950.
44. Le Billon, Philippe. “The Political Ecology of War: Natural Resources and Armed
Conflicts.” Political Geography 20, no. 5 (2001): 561-584. P. 571
45. Map A highlights the geographical location of the Copperbelt Province on the Zambian
map. http://www.touristlink.com/zambia/copperbelt/overview.html html
46. Map. B shows the major Copperbelt mining towns, as geographically located on the map of
Zambia. The map was accessed from https://www.csrm.uq.edu.au/events/smi-seminarchinese-mining-in-africa-its-global-controversy on 10/10/2016
47. McMahon, G. and Remy, F. (2001) Large Mines and the Community: Socioeconomic and
Environmental Effects in Latin America.
48. Molle, F. 2007, "Scale and Power in River Basin Management: the Chayo Phraya River in
Thailand," The Geographical Journal, vol. 173, no. 4, pp. 731-753.
49. Moore, D. S. (1993), “Contesting Terrain in Zimbabwe's Eastern Highlands: Political
Ecology, Ethnography, and Peasant Resource Struggles,” Economic Geography. P.380
50. Neumann, R. 2009, "Political Ecology: Theorizing Scale", Progress in Human Geography,
vol. 33, no. 3, pp. 398-406
51. Ngang, Mee Foong. Factors Influencing the Movement of Copper Price on London Metal
Exchange. Universiti Malaysia Sarawak, (UNIMAS), 2010.
52. Osei-Hwedie, Z, B. “Development Policy and Economic Change in Zambia: A ReAssessment,” 2003
53. Paulson, Susan, Lisa L. Gezon, and Michael Watts, eds. (2005). “Politics, Ecologies,
Genealogies.” Political Ecology Across Spaces, Scales and Social Groups. New Jersey.
Rutgers University Press. P.27
54. Peterson, U. (2002). “A Geochemical Study of the Kafue River, Zambia.” Lulea University
of Technology, Doctoral Thesis, 2002:46.
55. Rakner, L., van de Walle, N., and Mulaisho, D. 1999. “Zambia.” World Bank, Washington,
D.C.
56. Raju, MSR Gowtham, and A. Naga Sai. “Mining Industry and its Impact on Environment
and Human Health.”

71

57. Reclamation, A Global Perspective, Vol. 1 Report #RRTAC 89-2, Edmonton, Alberta:
Alberta Conservation and Reclamation Council.
58. Reed, David (2001). Economic Change, Governance and Natural Wealth: The Political
Economy of Change in Southern Africa. Earth scan Publications Limited. London
59. Ripley, E.A. et al. (1996), Environmental Effects of Mining. Delray Beach, Florida: St.
Lucie Press.
60. Rocheleau, D. E. (2008), “Political Ecology in the Key of Policy: From Chains of
Explanation to Webs of Relation,” Geoforum, 39, 716-727
61. Ross, M. L. (1999), “The Political Economy of the Resource Curse,” World Politics Vol.
51(2): 297-322.
62. Schuler, Philip M.; Lokanc, Martin. 2015. “Zambia Economic Brief: Making Mining Work
for Zambia.” Zambia Economic Brief; issue no. 5. Washington, D.C.: World Bank Group.
63. SGAB, SWECO, THOMRO and UNZA. (2005). “Preparation of Phase 2 of a Consolidated
Environmental Management Plan – Project Summary Report.” ZCCM Investments
Holdings, Copperbelt Environment Project.
64. Sideri, S. and S. Johns (eds) (1990), Mining for Development in the Third World:
Multinational Corporations, State Enterprises and the International Economy. New York:
Pergamon Press.
65. Simpere, Anne-Sophie. The Mopani Copper Mine: How European Development Money
Has Fed a Mining Scandal. Counter Balance: Challenging the EIB, 2010.
66. Simutanyi, Neo. 2006. “Neo-Liberalism and the Relevance of Marxism to Africa: The Case
of Zambia.” Paper presented at the 3rd International Conference on The Works of Karl
Marx and the Challenges of the 21st Century, Havana, Cuba, 3-6 May 2006. Accessed July
21, 2016. http://www.nodo50.org/cubasigloXXI/congreso06/conf3_simutanyi.pdf
67. Singh, Gurdeep. “Environmental Issues with Best Management Practice of Coal Mining in
India.” Responsible Mining–a Multistakeholder Perspective (2006).
68. Starke, Linda, ed. Breaking New Ground: Mining, Minerals and Sustainable Development:
the MMSD Project of the International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED).
Earth scan, 2002
69. “Sustainable Development in Zambia: Experiences and Ways Forward.”
http://www.ias.unu.edu/sub_page.aspx?catID=107&ddlID=207. Accessed. 9/7/2016

72

70. Swyngedouw, E. 2007, "Techno-natural Revolutions: the scalar politics of Franc's hydrosocial dream for Spain, 1939-75", Transactions of the British Institute of British
Geographers NS, vol. 32, no. 1, pp. 9-28.
71. Telser, L. G. (1958). “Futures Trading and the Storage of Cotton and Wheat.” The Journal
of Political Economy, 66, 233–255.n 10/10/2016
72. “Tragically Undermined.” The Economist. 2002. Accessed October 27, 2016.
http://www.economist.com/node/1154290.
73. Todaro, M. (1985), Economic Development in the Third World, New York, pp 50-180
74. UNCTAD. (2007) World Investment Report 2007: Transnational Corporations, Extractive
Industries and Development. New York: United Nations.
75. UNDP (2011) ‘Sustainability and Equity: A Better Future for All’ Explanatory note on
2011 Human Development Report composite indices
76. U.S. Geological Survey. 2014. Mineral Commodity Summaries 2014. Virginia: U.S.
Geological Survey.
77. Vidal, John. "'I Drank the Water and Ate the Fish. We All Did. The Acid Has Damaged Me
Permanently'" The Observer. 2015. Accessed December 07, 2016.
https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2015/aug/01/zambia-vedanta-pollutionvillage-copper-mine.
78. World Bank and International Corporation, “Mining and Development: Treasure or
Trouble?” Mining in Developing Countries. 2002.
79. World Bank. 2004. Zambia: Country Economic Memorandum. World Bank, Washington,
D.C.
80. World Bank. 2003. Zambia: Public Expenditure Management and Financial Accountability
81. Yin, K. R. (2003) Case Study Research: Design and Methods. 3rd edition. Sage
Publication, London and New Delhi. P. 6
82. Zimmerer, K. S. & Bassett, T. J. (2003), Political Ecology: An Integrative Approach to
Geography and Environment-Development Studies, The Guilford Press, New York, 311pp

73

